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Abstract
Distributed manufacturing operations include cyber-physical systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Long time not considered a
priority, cybersecurity jumped to the forefront of manufacturing concerns due to the need to network together legacy, newer
equipment, and entire operation centers. This paper proposes trustworthiness solutions for integrated manufacturing physicalcyber worlds, where trustworthiness is defined to complement system dependability requirements with cybersecurity
requirements, such that the resulting manufacturing cyber-physical system delivers services that can justifiably be trusted.
Acknowledging the inevitability of cyber-attacks, the paper models the cybersecurity component using the resilient systems
framework, where system resilience is viewed as preservation of a required state of cybersecurity.
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1. Introduction
The current manufacturing worldwide operations trend imposes the presence of all established requirements in
terms of manufacturing design processes and actual operations, combined with an increased safety and flexibility of
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operations. In addition, it requires the presence of more recent cybersecurity protection of electronic transactions
between distributed operation centers [1].
The high-tech progress in material science research, and the information and communication technologies made
the development of manufacturing cyber-physical systems a reality. Not only physical facilities can be linked
together through network applications and coordinate their applications, but also physical operations can be
simulated in real-time in cyber centers. The resulting benefits are significant, and to name a few, cyber-physical
coordination leads to reduced raw material used in testing, prototyping, and actual operations, as well as increased
safety of finished products [2]. Moreover, the manufacturing cyber-physical systems include a wide range of sensing
devices and data processing capabilities that can provide online monitoring of manufacturing processes, thus further
reducing the chances of scrapped lots and increasing the safety of the actual manufacturing operations, through
production abort commands, whenever hazardous events, or out-of-specifications environment conditions are
detected [3].
Since all good things come with a price tag, the path towards manufacturing cyber-physical systems has one of its
own. Just as all other network-based or Internet-based systems, cyber-physical distribution of manufacturing
operations include systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Long time not considered a priority, cybersecurity jumped to
the forefront of manufacturing concerns due to the need to network together legacy, newer equipment, and entire
operation centers. Many of the legacy operations are controlled by Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems that automatically monitor and adjust process control activities and control physical pieces of
equipment [4, 5]. However, many SCADA systems were designed and built in the 1980s without any regard of
cybersecurity. Recent research discusses also the need to network traditional stand-alone equipment such as PLCcontrolled and CNC machines, which were never designed with any control measure for data security. The newer
systems have their cybersecurity problems of their own, as many of the Internet of Things devices embedded on
physical manufacturing equipment, such as sensors and data processing and communication hardware, are reported
to be easily hacked and become the port of entry for intruders to the manufacturing network data centers [6, 7].
Given all the above issues, within the manufacturing and cybersecurity fields, the capability of virtualized
manufacturing operations to prevent, respond, thwart and/or recover from cyber-attacks is now becoming an active
area of research.
This paper proposes trustworthiness solutions for integrated manufacturing physical-cyber worlds, where
trustworthiness is defined to complement system dependability requirements with cybersecurity requirements, such
that the resulting manufacturing cyber-physical system delivers services that can justifiably be trusted. System
dependability, traditionally, includes operational availability, reliability, safety, and maintainability requirements,
which can only be enhanced by the advancement of cyber-physical systems in manufacturing operations.
Cybersecurity includes aspects such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and assurance of data
transactions and/or computer systems, and to a lesser extent anonymity of data records and transactions.
Acknowledging the inevitability of cyber-attacks, this paper models the cybersecurity component using the resilient
systems framework, where system resilience is viewed as preservation of a required state of cybersecurity [8, 9].
From this point forward, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the trustworthy manufacturing
cyber-physical model, with its dependability and cybersecurity requirements, and introduces the concept of system
resilience in the face of cyber-attacks. Next, Section 3 provides insights for the cyber-resilience mechanisms through
simulation modeling. The paper concludes with a brief section summarizing the importance of cybersecurity
adoption within manufacturing domain and a discussion related to needed further investigation of manufacturing
cyber-physical systems.
2. Trustworthy Manufacturing Cyber-Physical Systems
Previous authors’ work identified the framework for the development of manufacturing cyber-physical systems,
emphasizing aspects such as complex event processing, virtualization, Internet of Things adoption, Big Data
analytics, and cyber-attacks targets and vehicles [1-3]. This current work goes further into modeling aspects by
adding to the mix traditional operational requirements such as availability, reliability, safety, and maintainability,
many times known as system dependability, and detailing cybersecurity protection mechanisms.
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Fig. 1. Trustworthiness requirements within the manufacturing cyber-physical systems framework.

The resultant system, presented in Fig. 1, is deemed as exhibiting trustworthiness requirements by delivering
services that can be trusted with a certain level of confidence. The dependability and cybersecurity requirements that
form the trustworthiness platform use a combination of lower level requirements usually present in physical
processing and computer network systems. System operational availability, reliability, maintainability, and safety
requirements are well studied in the manufacturing literature and are not the subject of this work. On the cyber
world side, the cybersecurity requirements are part of the computer and network security domains, but have not been
studied in detail from the manufacturing environment perspective. Both the dependability and cybersecurity
requirements in the context of manufacturing domain are detailed in Fig. 2.

Fig. 2. Elements of trustworthiness for the manufacturing cyber-physical system.
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The actual requirements listed in Fig. 1 and 2 are likely examples of what dependability and cybersecurity
requirements would be for actual distributed manufacturing operations. Availability, reliability, and maintainability
of manufacturing equipment is defined by its vendors, so it could vary based on the scope and resources. Safety
requirement is using the IEC 61508 [10] standard for programmable controllers in the process control industry, but,
once again, it could vary based on the scope and resource. Confidentiality, integrity, and data availability are known
in the security community as the CIA triad [11]. Confidentiality assures protection of data from disclosure to
unauthorized parties and is usually enforced through data encryption. Integrity assures data protection from being
modified by unauthorized parties and is usually ensured through archiving and redundancy of data transmission.
Availability assures that authorized parties are able to access the data when needed, and it is obtained through
different mechanisms that protect the system and data from external attacks, such as denial of service attacks. The
other two cybersecurity requirements, authenticity and assurance are complementary to the CIA triad and further
help distributed manufacturing actors in trustworthy data transactions through digital signature capabilities and
permission and protection mechanisms.
3. System Resilience Research Methodology
There is a growing literature in the domain of system resilience, and a significant number of definitions were
proposed. The common denominator of all resiliency definitions includes the following aspects: unexpected event,
nominal performance, degradation of performance, recovery, and specific amount of time acceptable for each
application. Thus, we define system resilience as the ability of the system to recover to its nominal performance
level, in an acceptable amount of time, after the occurrence of an unexpected event that resulted in a degradation of
the level of performance, well below the nominal level. There are at least two comprehensive literature overview in
the resilience arena, with the second one published just a few months ago [12, 13]. While resilience can reside in
both the physical and cyber worlds, and thus is a key aspect for low cost, continuous, manufacturing operations, this
work builds models for the system resilience in the face of cyber-attacks, or cyber-resilience.
Looking again at the above resilience definition, one of its blurred aspects is related to the amount of time
considered acceptable for each application. This carry a paramount importance for cyber-resilience given the
extremely strict time requirements imposed on cyber systems. The recovery length of time could be short, in which
case the system exhibits high resilience, or it could be longer, in which case the system is said to have low resilience.
For two systems that are perturbed by the same external unexpected event at the same time, and degraded to the
same level of lower performance, the low and high resilience systems bounce back to the initial level of performance
in significant different timeframes. As an interesting fact, the same type of behavior was also observed in nonengineering systems [14]. The low and high cyber-resilience profiles are presented in Fig. 3 below.

Fig. 3. Low and high resilience profiles.

The amount of time to recover to the initial level of performance, if possible, is one of the most used resilience
metrics identified in several works [15-17]. Another straightforward metric is given by the impact on performance
calculated either, as the difference between nominal level of performance and the degraded level of performance, the
proportion of the degraded level of performance in relation to initial nominal performance level, or the area under

Radu F. Babiceanu and Remzi Seker / Procedia Manufacturing 11 (2017) 973 – 981

the performance curve which is lost. Those metrics can be easily inferred on the chart of Fig. 3. There are other
resilience metrics proposed in the literature, out of which this work will look at the network-related ones [18]. Even
resilience is viewed as an after the fact approach measured through one of its metrics, the trustworthy manufacturing
cyber-physical system considers embedding resilience mechanisms into both the physical and cyber worlds to
eliminate or mitigate the effects of any system malfunction and/or breach. Specifically, this work considers cyberresilience aspect and models resilience mechanisms with the objective of preservation of the required state of
security.
This research objective is exemplified in the diagram of Fig. 4, where the distributed manufacturing system is
subjected to directed external events, such as cyber-attacks, and random disturbances, which are both processed
within the data module through cyber and physical resilience mechanisms. The resilience metrics need be chosen
such that they model the changes in the system performance as inferred from Fig. 3. Also, the resilience mechanisms
need be designed such that they minimize the adverse impact of the external events and recover the system to the
required state of security in an acceptable amount of time. The type of mitigation and recovery algorithms depend on
the scope and layout of the system under analysis, as distribution of manufacturing nodes within a network may
differ from one layout to another.

Fig. 4. Distributed manufacturing system network.

4. Manufacturing Cyber-Resilience Mechanisms Simulation Model
Distributed manufacturing across different location geographically distinct requires a constant exchange of
design, testing, control, and operations data. This adds to the communication needs between the physical world -physical manufacturing-- and cyber world --simulated manufacturing-- already discussed above. The simulation
model considers the operations of a manufacturing system network formed of two distributed manufacturing
organizations (systems), each of them including a certain number of manufacturing nodes, subjected to denial of
service (DOS) attacks. The DOS attacks target either the two distributed systems or the network between the two
distributed systems. The two distributed systems form a manufacturing network on their own with physical and
cyber worlds components, while the larger network connecting the two distributed systems includes only cyber
world components. The overall distributed system is presented in Fig. 5, where the block stereotype model either a
physical or cyber component, while the flow specification stereotype model elements of the internal or external
communication networks.
4.1. Cyber-resilience metrics and mechanism
The resilience metric included in the model is the performance of the communication link to forward packets
(data and/or control packets) between two network nodes, and across the entire network when the network nodes are
subjected to DOS attacks. The model considers that a node of a network is targeted with a defined probability, and
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the attack is successful with another defined probability. The actual packet flow performance comes from the
network science domain and is defined as the percentage of maximum flow that a directed network supports as edges
are blocked or removed from the network [15, 19]. Thus, the flow performance of a network link can be defined as:

Fig. 5. Distributed manufacturing system network.

 

   

(1)

where,   is the flow forwarded by a node into a link at time , and  is the nominal flow forwarded by a
node into a link.
It results that the link flow resilience can be defined as:
 

      

(2)

where,   is the probability that the node is attacked at time  , and  is the probability that the attack on the
node is successful.
The resilience mechanism included in the model is designed to re-route the packets subject to delays through
other less crowded communication links should any of the node processing becomes slow or unable to forward data
and/or control packets. A similar mechanism could be devised using the actual packet queues measured in front of
the processing nodes with rerouting occurring based on algorithmic evaluation of queue lengths. A measure for the
performance of the resilience mechanism, R, is defined in relation with the percentage of denied service. The denied
service includes the number of packets that were discarded at the under-attack nodes. Packets can be discarded due
to time delays in queue or exceeding queue capacity.






(3)
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where,  is the number of packets discarded, and  is the total number of packets forwarded through the
network.
4.2. Design of simulation experiments and simulation results
Using the distributed model depicted in Fig. 5, the nodes of the simulation model at time zero are linked as
follows. Within the two distributed systems, each of the six nodes (block modules) have active links, with nominal
performance, with each of the three flow specification modules. Outside the distributed systems, each of the six edge
block modules also have active links, with nominal performance, with six out of the nine network flow specification
modules. The simulation variables and decision modules include the created packets created (communication load),
packet processing at nodes (packet forwarding), decision variables related to node forwarding and link flow (DOS
attacks), and decision modules to re-route (resilience mechanisms). The communication load created in the system is
the same for both sets of simulation replications and the node forwarding process comes from the same statistical
distributions. Also, for both sets of simulation replications, the DOS attacks are using the same distributions and are
initialized at the same clock time. In other words, equal intensity and duration DOS attacks are activated in the
models.
In the first set of 100 simulation replications, DOS attacks target the internal distributed systems network and
resilience mechanisms are activated once the attacks are detected. The results of this simulation, identified as
component-level resilience profile, are presented in Fig. 6. The second set of 100 simulation replications consider
DOS attacks targeted at the communication network outside the two distributed systems and the resilience profile,
depicted as system-level resilience, are shown in Fig. 7. However, for both sets of replications the attacks still target
all the nodes of the part of model under study that carry flow at the time when DOS attacks are activated.

Fig. 6. Component-level resilience profile for the two distributed systems.

Fig. 7. System-level resilience profile for the network connecting the two distributed systems.

It can be seen from the two figures that the degradation in performance is more significant for the componentlevel resilience profile, which does not fully recover to its initial nominal performance level in the set simulation
replication time. The calculated percentage of denied service for the two sets of simulation replications is depicted in
Fig. 8. All the simulation variables listed above are coming from statistical distributions and can be customized for
different system scenarios.
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Fig. 8. Maximum percentage of packet denied service for the two sets of simulation.

5. Conclusions and Future Directions
This paper proposes a framework for the development of trustworthiness solutions for manufacturing cyberphysical systems, which include dependability and cybersecurity requirements. Detailed modeling is only performed
for the cybersecurity aspects by modeling a series of denial of service attacks against an overall manufacturing
network formed by physical and cyber world nodes. The results of the simulation study show that the cyberresilience mechanisms are better deployed when the number of network nodes is larger to permit re-routing of
packets in the network. By generalizing the results, it may be possible to adapt the solution to the cyber-resilience of
system-of-systems models, in which case it may become apparent that the resilience of the system-of-systems level
is higher than that of individual component systems of the system-of-systems.
Future research directions include the analysis of other cybersecurity attacks and their influence on the
component-level and system-level cyber-resilience. On another direction, the work can be enhanced by adding other
trustworthiness components to the system resilience model and evaluate their influence on the derived resilience
metrics.
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